

# HGAA: An Architecture to Support Hierarchical Group and Attribute-Based Access Control



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# Outline

- **Outline**
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- The Problem and Current Solutions
- HGAA
  - Overview
  - Attribute Authority & Attribute Certificate
  - Policy Authority & HGABAC Name Space
  - User Service Provider
- Implementation & Preliminary Results
- Conclusions

# Background

# HGABAC

## Hierarchical Group and Attribute-Based Access Control

### Earlier Work:


Daniel Servos and Sylvia L. Osborn. "HGABAC: Towards a formal model of hierarchical attribute-based access control." *International Symposium on Foundations and Practice of Security (FPS'2014)*. November 5, 2014

# HGABAC

## Hierarchical Group and Attribute-Based Access Control


- Formal attribute-based access control model
- Introduces concepts of hierarchical user and object groups.
- Goals:
  - Lightweight
  - Easy to comprehend policies
  - User and object groups to simplify administration
  - Scalable
  - Ability to emulate traditional models (MAC, DAC, RBAC)
- Shown to be capable of emulating MAC, DAC and RBAC (including hierarchical roles).

# HGABAC



Attributes are defined as a combination of **an attribute name, attribute type** and a **set of values**.


# HGABAC



## Supported attribute types:

- User
- Object
- Connection (Session)
- Environment
- Admin (Constant)


# HGABAC





# HGABAC


## User Group Hierarchy Example



- Group hierarchies are directed acyclic graphs in which all possible paths end in Min Group, a group with no attributes assigned.
- A member of a group is assigned the attributes of the group they are a member as well as all groups on the path to Min Group

# HGABAC

## User Group Hierarchy Example



### Example:

User assigned to Gradstudents groups would have an effective attribute set of:

```
{  
(student_level, {1, 2}),  
(employe_level, 1),  
(room_access, {MC8, MC10, MC355, MC325})  
}
```

In addition to any directly assigned attributes.

# HGABAC

## Policy Language

- Original HGABAC work introduces HGPLv1
- Attribute-based policy language designed for HGABAC
- Aims to be simple and support C-like syntax
- Trinary logic: TRUE, FALSE, UNDEF

# HGABAC

## Policy Language

### Examples:

P1: `user.age >= 18 AND object.title = "Adult Only Book"`

P2: `user.id = object.author`

P3: `user.role IN {"doctor", "intern", "staff"} AND  
user.id != object.patient`

P4: `object.type = "program" AND object.required_certifications  
SUBSET user.certifications`

P5: `env.time_of_day_hour >= 9 AND env.time_of_day_hour <= 17`

# The Problem & Current Solutions

# The Problem

- Many ABAC models exist but few full solutions.
- Need architecture to fill in the gaps.
- Need to address questions like:
  - Who assigns the attributes and how?
  - How are attributes shared with each party?
  - How does the user provide proof of attribute ownership?
  - Where and how are policies evaluated?
  - How will the model scale in real-world use?

# Current Solutions

- AAA Authorization Framework (RFC 2904)
- XACML: eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
- SAML: Security Assertion Markup Language
- NIST Policy Machine, of particular note:
  - Smriti Bhatt, Farhan Patwa, and Ravi Sandhu.  
"ABAC with Group Attributes and Attribute Hierarchies Utilizing the Policy Machine". *ABAC 2017*. March 24.

# Limitations of Current Efforts


- Offline Policy Information Point (Attribute Stores/Authorities)
- Public Key Infrastructure Overhead
- Future Support for Delegation Concepts
- HGABAC Support
  - Attributes as name value pairs
  - Groups
  - Hierarchy
- Lightweight Approach



# **HGAA: Hierarchical Group Attribute Architecture**

# HGAA


## Overview



# HGAA

## Overview

Comprised of three core service types: Attribute Store Services, User Services, and Policy Decision Point Services



# HGAA

## Namespace

- Require a way of uniquely identifying attributes and users from different authorities.
- URI based namespace similar to one used in XACML.

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Absolute URI:

hgabac://<authority>[[/<type>]/<element\_name>]

Relative URI:

- [ / ]<type>/<element\_name>  
| [ / ]<element\_name>
- type:
  - user
    - | group[ /user | /object ]
    - | attribute[ /<att\_sub\_type> ]
    - | object[ /<obj\_sub\_type> ]
    - | session
    - | operation
    - | permission
    - | policy
    - | service

att\_sub\_types:

- user
  - | object
  - | environment
  - | admin
  - | connection
  - | unknown

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n XACML.

# HGAA

## Namespace

- Require a way of uniquely identifying attributes and users from different authorities.
- URI based namespace similar to one used in XACML.

## Examples:

hgabac://cs1.ca/attribute/user/age

/attribute/user/age


Authority

Attribute Type

Attribute Name

/attribute/age

# Attribute Store Service



Users request an attribute certificate from their home attribute authority containing a subset of their assigned attributes.


# Attribute Certificate

- Loosely based on X.509 Attribute Certificates but do not require X.509 infrastructure
- Contains information about issuer (attribute authority), holder (the user), their activated attribute set and a number of other properties.
- Includes User and Connection attributes.
- Cryptographically signed by attribute authority.
- Offer proof of attribute ownership.




# Attribute Certificate


## ACInformation



## ACIssuer




## ACHolder




# Attribute Certificate


## Attribute




## ACRevocationRules




## ACDelegationRules



## ACExtension




# User Services



User authenticates with and makes requests upon services by providing their signed attribute certificate as part of the request.


# Policy Decision Point Service




User services evaluate access request by contacting a Policy Decision Point Service with a copy of the user's attribute certificate, relevant object attributes and policy ID.

# Implementation & Preliminary Results

# Implementation: Services




# Implementation: Services



JSON based webservices implemented in Python using Ladon framework and SQLAlchemy ORM

# Implementation: HGPL Interpreter




- HGPL interpreter created in Python that utilizes a recursive descent parsing strategy.
- Policies stored as precomputed AST.
- When combined with attributes, result is a TRUE, FALSE or UNDEF decision.



# Preliminary Results


## Attribute Certificate



# Preliminary Results


## Attribute Certificate

Time to Generate Attribute Certificate v.s. Number of User Attributes



# Preliminary Results


## Attribute Authority



# Preliminary Results

## HGPL Interpreter


Time to Interpret Policy 100,000 Times v.s. Number of AST Nodes



# Preliminary Results


## HGPL Interpreter

Time to Decode or Generate AST v.s. Number of AST Nodes



# Preliminary Results

## HGPL Interpreter



# Conclusions & Future Work

# Conclusions

- First architecture that supports full HGABAC model.
- Attribute Certificate specification and encoding presented.
- HGABAC namespace introduced.
- HGPL updated and interpreter created.
- Preliminary evaluation suggests linear scalability (with number of attributes and number of AST nodes).



# Directions for Future Work

- Explore applicability to other ABAC models.
- Further evaluate architecture under more diverse and real-world scenarios.
- Investigate use of XACML and/or SAML and impact on performance.
- Extending HGABAC and HGAA to support user-to-user temporary delegation.
- Incorporate administration model (use  $GURA_G$ ?).

# Questions?